It is less than twenty-four hours since Mr. Trump shocked so many by winning the White House race. The jury on what form his policies will take will be out for some time yet. But we can anticipate interesting possibilities.
During the election Trump characterised the impact, should he win, as “Brexit plus plus plus”. The international markets have already reacted more favourably to his election than to Brexit. Although not discussed in detail on the BBC this morning, we can anticipate that Trump might well slash taxes – something regrettably politically impossible here in Britain. Reagan did just that, against the advice of key officials – with significant positive effect on the US economy and more widely. There is certainly scope to slash the US federal corporate tax. At 35% it is hardly a business stimulant.
What about foreign affairs? What is the likelihood of Trump’s resetting the US-Russian relationship? Early Russian reactions indicate hope on their side that this will happen and that the US will show more respect for Russia. Trump might not have a high EQ score – so to what extent he can empathise with Putin and his cohort is open to question. There is certainly ground to be made up. The West’s handling of Russian sensitivities in the aftermath of the dissolution of the USSR did not show much mindfulness – and our realisation that Russia could bring its influence to bear on Milosevic to accelerate the withdrawal of Serb forces from Kosovo was extremely slow. Furthermore, our engagement with Russia on issues associated with Libya has been consistently poor and the West’s handling of Russian expansionism in the Crimea was not astute. And the US and British governments owe Syria-watchers an explanation on why they have taken nearly six years to realise what was obvious from the start: that Russia was and is not going to allow the defeat of the Alawite regime in Syria.
So how could this translate into a more pragmatic US-Russia relationship – and what might this mean for the Syrian conflict? Firstly, it is essential that Trump is urgently persuaded to put his weight fairly and squarely behind NATO. Trump’s indications to the contrary during the US election have been damaging; Russia respects force and the willingness to use it. Secondly, that the US works towards stopping all support – whether proxy or direct – for opposition fighters in Aleppo; such support, from various quarters, has served only to prolong the suffering. And thirdly the US could explicitly acknowledge that a continuation of the Alawite regime in some form – in due course without Assad – remains the best outcome for the West, for moderation and for regional stability.
These three steps could prepare the way for a meeting between Trump and Putin. The stakes would need to be high enough to justify a direct meeting. And, in pursuit of greater goals, Trump could perhaps be persuaded not to tear up the Iranian nuclear deal. Despite commendable efforts, Secretary Kerry and Foreign Secretary Lavrov ultimately lacked the clout to do what the two presidents might just – in concert with other interested parties – be able to pull off .