Yesterday’s report by the Foreign Affairs Committee into the conduct of the 2011 Libya operation contained many criticisms. While Western governments have been promoting a “comprehensive approach” for many years to deal with difficult states, our approach is not truly comprehensive. Political, security and economic lines of operation are often planned and developed in isolation. Different teams work on each track and often sequentially rather than in parallel. This is partly a function of limited capacity and partly because those who formulate the policies are not integrated into one staff.
The British government promotes “security, stability and prosperity” as the “ends” or objectives of our policy in conflict-affected states such as Libya, Yemen or Somalia. The sequence of the words implies that prosperity is to be sought once the first two aspirations are realized. But inferring that efforts towards prosperity must await stability and security will reduce hope. Libyans and others want to be able to put bread on the table, just as urgently as they want security.
So, how can we help develop a better strategy?
- Reacquire a notion of “strategic patience”. Our government demonstrated strategic patience over Northern Ireland. British soldiers knew they were there for the long haul, to hold the ring while others searched for a political solution and implemented economic policies to rectify the effects of discrimination, to incentivise business and lay the foundations for prosperity. Since then, we have lost the habit. We knew we were never in for the long haul in Iraq and Afghanistan. The desired outcome was to enable elections and leave as soon as possible thereafter. And so premature was our loss of interest in Sierra Leone that we had to return to the fray in 2000, in order to save the country. The British Army’s one-time mantra of “first in, first out” is not viable.
- Be more thoughtful in formulating our “key messages”. Countering migration or countering Da’esh (ISIS) are promoted as the objectives in Libya, Iraq and elsewhere. In an age of social media, audiences cannot be neatly separated from each other. Thus, these messages appeal to our ministers and perhaps superficially to our own people, but betray our self-interest to those who live there. A preferred strategic message is that we seek prosperity for the countries concerned. That should be our goal. It is long term and indicates that we will not cut and run once a thin veneer of security is in place. Getting properly onto the road to prosperity will be a crucial element in countering instability.
- Plan and finance the reintegration of armed group members into civil society. This needs thinking about from the earliest stages of our efforts to help fragile states. This is because it may take up to two years to identify the absorption capacity of different employment sectors, establish international commercial partnerships, mentoring schemes, lines of credit and vocational training – and advertise the plan convincingly. Security, stability and prosperity are in the end utterly dependent on sustainable alternative livelihoods for the men with guns. On that note, “demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration”, as the term for a process, is wrong. It should be DRD; disarmament only really happens after reintegration has taken place, and can take up to ten years to achieve.
- Remember that “kinetic” military action does not resolve problems on its own. Military action can be very important but is rarely decisive as a strategy. It is best used in context and as just one means to an end. Libya in 2011 is but one example. In 1999, we eventually and belatedly realized that bombing on its own was not going to persuade President Milosevic to remove his forces from Kosovo. And one reason why Prime Minister Cameron lost the House of Commons vote in August 2013 on airstrikes against the Assad regime is because he failed to explain to MPs how such military action would fit into a wider strategy. Gambling that a bit of light bombing would remove Assad and in turn lead to better governance for Syria clearly failed to convince. It would have been more form than substance, reassuring us that we had the power to punish Assad but not actually to change anything.
- Bottom up – as well as top down. Power is not “smart” unless it includes the long-haul and patient work to turn a country round by helping its communities become more resilient. This may not appeal to ministers because it is low key, “unsexy” and doesn’t catch the news. But it is nonetheless very important. In the case of Iraq, this means helping the Al-Abadi government to provide better services, support and protection to the Sunni communities in order to re-empower them and help them to withstand not only Da’esh but also the unforeseen threats of the future. In essence, British policy for Iraq must be predicated on much more than helping to defeat Da’esh as a short term expedient.
- Integrate economic experts into senior policy teams. For almost all of these elements of strategy, policy teams need to include economic experts. These men and women might well have had substantial commercial backgrounds. DFID and UKTI have their place but not in this context.
- Work through and with the locals rather than fight their wars for them. We should consider taking the risks involved in embedding teams of officers and soldiers in the host country’s forces – should we be invited to do so. The US Army did this in Iraq and we did not. As a result, the Americans had better “ground truth” and influence and were called upon to help the Iraqi army to overcome enemy forces in and around Basra in Operation ‘Charge of the Knights” in 2008, while we were excluded. Commitment costs – and ultimately counts. And it is a mark of our seriousness, or lack of it.